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Divine Power in Process Theism, A Philosophical Critique, by David
Basinger. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. Pp. viii and
135. N.P.
LEWIS S. FORD, Old Dominion University.
There have been several critiques of process theism by conservative evangelicals, such as the anthology on Process Theology, edited by Ronald H. Nash
(Baker, 1988). None are as sustained as this. Moreover, Basinger's critique
comes from that strand of evangelical thought (free-will theism) that is closest
in many respects to process theism. He also seeks to get inside the logic of
the process position in order to present an internal critique. This is no simple
external comparison relying upon its differences with classical Christianity,
but raises some fresh questions which call for fresh responses.
Basinger sees that the central question is whether God has the power to
unilaterally bring about any state of affairs. Free-will theists hold that God
does, but does not exercise that power out of deference to human freedom.
Process theists hold that God cannot so act.
Unfortunately the debate has been generally couched in terms of persuasion
and coercion, and Basinger adopts this dichotomy. From the standpoint of
process theism, for which every actualization is a subjective response to a
divine creative lure, any unilateral divine actualization would ride roughshod
over that subjective response and thereby be coercive. But from the standpoint of classical theism, where beings must first be created by God before
they can act freely, there can be many unilateral divine acts which are not
coercive, when the freedom or the will in question has not yet come into
being. The key issue is whether any actualization can be brought about unilaterally, or whether every actualization involves multiple factors, such as
God, the multiple past, and the immediate SUbjective activity of integration.
(I think the issue should be put in terms of whether God acts only finally,
and never efficiently. However we conceive efficient causation, final causation cannot be unilateral, always requiring other causation as well. Other
process thinkers, however, suggest that God also exercises efficient causation, understanding 'persuasion' to be the absence of 'coercion' in the sense
of unilateral determination. Yet I think persuasion is more than the absence
of coercion, as including some positive response to some value. In any case,
process theists usually agree that God at least acts finally, even if the question
of divine efficient causation is disputed.)
For the purposes of the debate between classical and process theism this
metaphysical background, while the ultimate basis of the claims made by
process thinkers, is largely ignored, and the issue is simplified in terms of
'persuasion' and 'coercion.' In the end this will not do. Basinger is able to
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make his case largely by exploiting the ordinary meanings of these terms.
Thus in the first chapter he argues that "a being with the attributes of the God
of process theism could coerce other beings in the sense in which we normally
use the term" by means of psychological compulsion and subliminal suggestion (pp. 33-35, 39). If so, process theism is in the end not much different
from free-will theism, in which God could coerce, but chooses not to. This
is a complex issue, but it really boils down to whether God can unilaterally
actualize anything. Compulsion, suggestion, even threats, cannot be unilateral, for they necessarily involve the responsiveness of another.
Now Basinger does challenge the claim by some process theists that "God
never unilaterally brings about any state of affairs" (p. 28) by examining the
role of God in providing the initial lure which the occasion actualizes. "Each
automatically becomes aware of God's initial aim at each moment and feels
some compulsion to actualize it. But, of course, for God to bring it about
unilaterally that other entities have such cognitive/affective experiences is
for God to bring about unilaterally certain states of affairs" (p. 28). Yet such
experience is part of the subjective becoming whereby some actuality is
produced, not the total actuality itself, which depends both upon the lure and
the subjective response to the lure. "State of affairs" is vague enough to cover
both cases. We can say that God unilaterally introduces the divine lure into
the process, but this is not sufficient by itself to actualize the product; this is
not unilateral actualization.
The second chapter gets to the heart of the matter. Basinger argues that
these three claims, made by process theists, are mutually inconsistent:
(a) God cannot act coercively, but only persuasively
(b) Persuasion is always better than coercion
(c) If God could act coercively, God should intervene on occasion.

The second claim (b) can only be effective if God is able to choose between
either acting persuasively or coercively, yet the first claim (a) denies this.
Moreover, if (b) persuasion is always better than coercion, then there is no
foundation for (c), which is process theism's stock critique of classical theism: if God is so all-powerful, we should see more evidence of divine activity
to eliminate surplus evil.
Free-will theism rejects (a), insists upon (b) in the sense that God allows
for human freedom, and uses (b) to reject (c).
If this is a forced option, as it certainly appears to be, process theism must
adopt the first alternative (a) as metaphysically required by the nature of
becoming. The other two arise out of the discussion with classical theism.
The first (a) and third (c) are consistent with each other, but only ifthe second
(b) is modified. Perhaps something like this would work: if God could only
act persuasively or only act unilaterally, it is metaphysically better that God
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act persuasively. The choice here is between different metaphysical alternatives, only one of which could be actual. If God can act either way, then
coercion is sometimes better than persuasion. But this is a difficult issue, not
easily resolvable in a short review. Basinger has raised an important criticism
here.
While process theists often point to the superiority of persuasion over
coercion in many human instances, Basinger can point to acceptable instances
of coercion, as in parenting. "Can process theists ever condone the use of
such coercive power?" (p. 20). I think so, provided the second claim (b) above
is qualified. Can God ever seek such coercion? Yes, but only indirectly, since
all efficient causation is to some extent coercive, and requires the cooperative
response of finite creatures. It is not coercive power itself which is questionable, for it is finite in all instances we encounter. What is problematic is the
infinite coercive power which God would have were it possible for God to
act coercively in any direct fashion. Such infinite unilateral power would be
all-determinative.
In subsequent chapters this problematic between divine persuasion and
coercion is developed with respect to the problem of evil, eschatology (the
ultimate triumph of the good), petitionary prayer, and spiritual discernment.
In each instance the solution of process theism is found to be self-consistent,
but not superior to free-will theism. Often the argument precedes by the
contrast that in process theism God cannot act coercively under any circumstances, while in free-will theism God can act coercively, but doesn't, out of
respect for human freedom. For all practical purposes, God then acts coercively only twice, at the creation and the eschaton. Since in process terms
any creation involves some degree of free response other than God, respect
for (creaturely) freedom excludes divine unilateral actualization at all times,
even at these end-points.
I don't think petitionary prayer is given its due, but this may be the fault
of its process exponents. Basinger recognizes that within classical theism it
may be doubted whether petitionary prayer 'changes things.' "But since the
God of process theism cannot unilaterally intervene and is already doing all
that can be done, it makes no sense for process theists to literally petition
God (ask God) for anything" (p. 98). Yet such a God is continually being
transformed by the world in general, and by our petitions in particular. What
God is in any situation is affected by our responses, and would be different
without them. The specific nature of the aims God provides depend on the
nature of the prior response. To be sure, God cannot intervene by unilaterally
actualizing any situation, but God is continually participating in that actualization by divine aims which are constantly capable of change. It is also true,
in a general sense, that God is always doing all that can be done, but that is
concretely relative to all the factors in that situation, including all specific
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subjective responses. Petitionary prayer is simply a formalized version of
such subjective response.
In the final chapter on spiritual discernment and the rational calculation of
divine purpose, Basinger contrasts classical theism's confidence in God's
ultimate goal as the betterment of mankind with the more openended approach of process theism. Thus Cobb and Griffin write, "God's aim is beyond
the possibility of our minds to fathom" (Process Theology: An Introductory
Exposition [Westminster, 1976], p. 125). Ultimate divine purposes which
concern human and nonhuman beings here on earth, as well as whatever
extraterrestrial existence there is, whether intelligent or not, cannot be so
anthropocentrically restricted. Yet God's proximate purpose for us may not
be so radically different from the goal as envisioned in classical theism.
Basinger counsels process theists to be quite tentative in endorsing any specific course of action as the one God actually sanctions (p. Ill). Wouldn't
that be equally good advice for everyone?

